Do Scruton's arguments show that fox-hunting is always morally justifiable?

Scruton begins with a contractarian argument. Animals do not have rights, as they are incapable of agreeing to assume the associated duties. Grant rights to a fox, and it becomes duty bound to respect the rights of its prey, which is unreasonable to expect.

However, in common with contractarians such a Hume and Rawls, he goes on to say that although animals have no rights, we still have duties towards them. However, this only applies to animals we have assumed a duty of care over. It does not apply to individual wild animals. The hunted fox has no rights, and we have no duty of care towards it. Thus, hunting cannot simply be immediately condemned [p185].

However, we do have duties towards 'foxes' as part of our wider duties towards the environment. This is more of a virtue ethics style approach. Our duties towards the environment are part of our obligation to uphold the virtues of sympathy and piety.

He summarises his argument in four principles: -

1. We must maintain, so far as possible, the balance of nature
2. We are entitled to intervene in the natural order to defend our own interests
3. The interests of all animals should be considered, including the humans
4. Our dealings with wild animals should be measured against the demands of sympathy, piety and human virtue.

Principle 1 is unlikely to be disagreed with. However, does it justify fox hunting? Does fox hunting help maintain the balance of nature?

Scruton argues that the fox is considered "a predator and a potential nuisance" [p276], and would normally be systematically exterminated. Fox hunters want to maintain their sport, and the extermination of the foxes would not be in their interests. What would be in their interests is the preservation of the fox, and the preservation of its habitat. As the foxes' habitat supports a wealth of other wildlife and generally makes the countryside a nicer place to be in, the presence of the hunt can be seen to contribute to the maintaining if the balance of nature. "Hunting with hounds has made its own very special contribution to the landscape" [p276].

This principle certainly supports the idea that fox hunting is compatible with sympathy and piety. It is pious to respect the balance of nature, and fox hunting contributes to the balance of nature, therefore fox hunting is compatible with piety. However, this merely supports the claim that fox hunting is not morally wrong. We are seeking the stronger claim of 'is it justified?'. We can't just show that fox hunting maintains the balance of nature, we must show that only fox hunting can do this.

There are plenty of species of animal which are being actively preserved by groups who have no interest in hunting them. Without fox hunting, we can be reasonably sure that one such group would take over the task of protecting the fox and its habitat.

Also, Scruton seems to believe that fox hunting is powerful enough to preserve the fox's habitat against the encroachment of mechanised farming [p276]. This is a questionable claim, as industrialisation is a powerful force, and it is unlikely that the need of a few thousand hunters would outweigh a country's need to grow food.

Therefore, this principle is only sufficient to show that fox hunting is not entirely unjustified.

Scruton's use of principle 2 is vague. When he talks about angling, he simply says "it is surely permitted" to cull predators, preserve habitats, eradicate diseases and so forth in order to maintain a stock of animals to catch [p274]. However, elsewhere he argues that there is "a real moral difference" between allowing a terrier to kill rats, and keeping tame rats for the purpose [p272]. If we are maintaining and preserving a species purely so we can hunt and kill them, is this really any different? Are we not in effect assuming a duty of care towards the species?

Scruton is presumably trying to say that the quality of life for the hunted animal is far better as a result of our intervention. The fish thrive in clean waterways, free of disease and the threat of predators. The foxes are protected from disease and the destruction of their habitat. This, however, is simply retreading the ground covered in our discussion of principle 1.

More worryingly, this principle can be twisted to justify any action we choose. After all, all actions are in somebody's interest. Also, it could be combined with another of Scruton's statements, that "we have a great interest" in keeping certain animals at a moral distance precisely because they provide us with sport [p273].

It would be uncharitable to assume that this was Scruton's intention, but it does demonstrate the flawed nature of this principle. Together with Scruton's very vague usage of it, it means we cannot rely on this principle for any justification.

Principle 3 is broadly classical utilitarianism, advocating maximum happiness for the maximum number. Scruton points to the enjoyment felt not only by the hunters, but also by the hounds and the horses. He argues that "against this great accumulation of human and animal delight, it would be difficult to count the fear and pain of the fox as an absolute moral obstacle" [p277; also p166].

Certainly this argument has the weight of numbers. However, we have to be very certain that the suffering of the fox really is as comparatively minor as Scruton claims. If a fun day out is one unit of enjoyment, and the number of hounds, plus horses, plus hunters total say a hundred, we have to be sure that the suffering of the fox is not one hundred units or greater.

This principle, as with all utilitarian style arguments, falls victim to practicality if it becomes important to accurately measure happiness and suffering. How does one compare the enjoyment of a day out to the suffering of being hunted to death? Are we even entitled to make the comparison? "Is it not cruel to think that one's own fun is sufficient to justify the suffering?" [p187]. It could be that regardless of the balance of suffering, the question of virtue must take precedence.

This brings us to principle 4, which is the critical consideration. Whether or not we are justified in putting the interests of humans above the interest of animals depends entirely on the compatibility with sympathy, virtue and piety [p167]. Any utilitarian style argument counts for nothing if an action is contrary to human virtue [p268].

Scruton points to the extensive literature and art that fox hunting has inspired, citing them as examples of human virtue being celebrated and enhanced [p276]. However, if we relied on art to support our arguments, we could justify war by pointing to the extensive array of paintings and literature that has celebrated it. Art is inspired as much, if not more, by suffering as by virtue.

He attempts to emphasise the virtues that hunting exemplifies - those of courage and noble pursuit of a worthy foe. It seems questionable as to whether the courage that hunting requires is the same as the virtuous courage he is claiming for it [p189]. It also seems questionable as to whether a single fox can be considered a 'worthy foe' in the face of a whole pack of hounds. This is a highly idealistic portrait of hunting.

He also points to the community spirit that fox hunting inspires, with farmers opening up their lands to the hunt and thereby expressing their piety. This seems to be assigning too much nobility to a simple act. While some farmers may indeed feel that opening up their lands celebrates human virtue and inspires pious feelings, others may simply have been paid.

Once again, empirical claims such as these cannot form a firm basis for a justification. At best, they show that hunting is not incompatible with human virtue. To really decide the issue conclusively, we must look at the central issue - the part played by the suffering of the fox.

Scruton's arguments are two-fold. Firstly, he claims the suffering of the fox is not as great as other forms of pest-control would be. It is not cruel. Secondly, the hunters do not take pleasure in the suffering, rather it is an unwanted by-product.

If one adopts a virtue ethics standpoint and viewed 'cruelty' as a vice, then if it could be shown that fox hunting was cruel we could show that fox hunting was ethically unjustifiable. Scruton argues that fox hunting is not cruel, as the suffering of the fox is minimal, and is far less than any alternative method of pest control. We are justified in killing foxes for pest control, as we have assumed a duty of care over those farm animals the fox preys on.

Naturally, the anti-hunting campaigners claim the suffering of the fox is substantial, and far exceeds that of the alternatives. Without evidence, one cannot know who is right. Yet there are other vices besides cruelty that fox hunting seems to display, such as callousness and failure of compassion [p187]. Scruton says nothing on this.

When considering the causing of suffering in the name of fun, Scruton identifies three motives. Causing suffering specifically to derive pleasure from it is invariably morally wrong. "it displays and encourages a viscous character" [p264].

When suffering is a means to an end, we must weigh the virtue of the end with the suffering involved in the means. With bull fighting for example, do the courageous virtues of the matador justify the suffering caused to the bull?

If the suffering is an unwanted by-product, as he claims is the case with fox hunting, then it is not incompatible with virtue [p186]. However, even if we accept the suffering is an unwanted by-product in the case of the fox's death, the hunt itself necessitates suffering. Just as a bull will not fight without being provoked, so a fox will not run without being scared. If the fox does not run, there can be no hunt. The suffering is not a by-product, it is a necessary means to an end.

Of course, just because the suffering is necessary, does not mean it is the objective. If suffering were the objective, then there would be far easier ways to go about it e.g. torturing a tame fox. Similarly, if the object were simply to kill the fox with no regards to virtue, then methods such as traps, guns and poison would be more effective.

So, we can reasonably accept that suffering is not the primary objective, but can we be sure it is not one of the secondary objectives? Would a hunter partake in an activity that was identical in every way to a foxhunt, but without any suffering? If not, we will be forced to conclude that the suffering is not just a necessary prerequisite, but an essential component.

Such an alternative exists. In draghunting, the hounds chase an artificial lure dragged by a volunteer. This is in every way a simulated fox hunt without the fox. If the only difference between these activities is the presence or absence of a fox, then we must conclude that the suffering of the fox is at least one objective of hunting.

Scruton's defence of the motives of fox hunters is entirely empirical, and no more substantial than "fox-hunting is not like that" [p278]. This may seem an uncharitable interpretation [p186], yet he himself admits that this "is where any defence of hunting would have to begin" [p277]. It is worth conceding though that I have put forward an argument that is not addressed in this article, and so it is unreasonable to demand a defence against it.

Finally, Scruton manages to slip in the claim that Plato supported fox hunting [p277], but this is clearly truth-by-authority, and unlikely to be intended as a serious argument.

Taking the arguments that Scruton uses, I have demonstrated that either the principles themselves, or their application to fox hunting, are flawed.

Therefore, I hope I have demonstrated that Scruton's arguments do not show that fox-hunting is always morally justifiable.

Bibliography

Course Texts
• Book 2 - Humans and Other Animals
Websites
• Countryside Alliance : http://www.countryside-alliance.org/
• Lucky Day (animal rights site) : http://www.luckydayinhell.com/