A432

Project

Applying a Virtue Ethics approach to the question:
Was Tony Blair right to take Britain into war with Iraq?

In 2003, Tony Blair, as leader of the UK government, sent the British army to invade Iraq. It was supposed to be a virtuous war, entered into with regret, and a number of arguments were put forward to justify it. I intend to bring a Virtue Ethics approach to examining these justifications and to assess whether the invasion was the act of a virtuous person.

Throughout this discussion I shall, wherever possible, give the most charitable interpretation to the arguments put forward. While many arguments put forward were supported by evidence now discredited, I shall assume that at the time the evidence was genuinely believed. I shall also examine each argument in isolation and on its own merits, avoiding any temptation to delve into theories of political corruption. The reason for this approach is to keep the discussion focussed on virtue ethics. A virtuous person would not go to war simply to line his own pockets, so considering the myriad conspiracy theories surrounding the invasion is unlikely to be useful. Instead, I shall examine the circumstances in which a virtuous person would choose war. By then comparing the circumstances we were in, I hope to ascertain whether the Iraq invasion really was a virtuous war.

Virtue Ethics (VE) is a comparatively new field, and so far most applications have focussed on scenarios of individuals by asking the question "if the person in this situation was a truly virtuous person, what would they do?"ⁱ. "[the] whole issue concerning VE and political theory ... has only just started to be exploredⁱⁱ". So, is it up to the task? How do we adapt concepts of personal virtue to events on the world stage, and to abstract questions about the justifiability of war?

"A major difficulty for modern virtue ethicists who want to extend virtue ethics into political theory is knowing where to startⁱⁱⁱ". We could tackle abstract with abstract, and treat sovereign states as analogous to individuals. After all, a state has interests, commitments, dependencies, obligations, just as an individual does. It is embedded within a web of ongoing relationships with other states^iv. To some it is friendly while to others it is neutral or hostile. A state could even be said to have a character, strengths and weaknesses. We could try and extend the analogy to the point where we are talking about virtuous states in the same way we'd talk about virtuous agents. A state that is prone to being misleading, or to going back on assurances given is a dishonest state, just like an individual behaving similarly. A state that allows or promotes the wholesale slaughter of a people is clearly callous and unjust, in the same way we might regard a serial killer. Thus, if we can regard a state in a similar way as we regard an individual, we can adapt the virtue ethics question to become "if the state in this situation was a truly virtuous state, what would it do?".

While I believe such an analogy could be drawn, it's perhaps a little too abstract. Therefore I will instead be focussing specifically on the individual in question. In this case, that means the leader of the country - Tony Blair.

The Virtuous Politician

Even on the world stage, most events are caused by the actions of individuals. If we accept the premise that all individuals are equal, then individuals who are heads of state can be judged on the same grounds as everybody else. After all, if Tony Blair lies, it is still dishonest. It's just that as Prime Minister he may be able to justify the dishonesty on the grounds of national security or diplomatic necessity or somesuch.

This immediately illustrates a conflict between being a good Prime Minister and being a good person. The notion of "good" is different in each case^v. "It is of fundamental importance to recognise that when one calls an individual 'a good X', one is not making a claim equivalent to 'that individual is good and it is an X'"^vi. There will be occasions where a Prime Minister is compelled to lie. When making delicate diplomatic negotiations with the various factions in Northern Ireland for example, one has to negotiate with people you know very well are or were terrorists while simultaneously publicly denouncing all terrorists and refusing to negotiate with them. An ally may be guilty of war crimes, but to denounce them would destroy a vital trade agreement and would decimate your country's economy.

This differs little from many professions. When asked "Is it nearly finished", the truth may be "We're being badly messed about by our suppliers, and it's not even started", but this would lose you the contract, the client and your job, so instead you say "there's just a few issues to resolve". The good person would come clean and tell the truth. The good professional would lie for the sake of the business.

So can we look at the ethics of being a Prime Minister in the same way that we might look at the ethics of any professional person, or is being a good Prime Minister a specifically moral role and thus more like being a good father? Many professions are purely functional, and never conflict with Virtue Ethics. "Someone can be a good flautist without, in any way, being a good or virtuous human being^vii" Honesty, courage, humility, or any other virtue will not make you a better flautist, even if they will make you a better person. On the other hand, professions that affect peoples' lives and welfare, such as doctor, teacher or lawyer do demand a degree of virtue^viii. However, there can be cases where one's professional virtues conflict with one's personal virtues. A doctor may save the life of a murderer. A lawyer may fight to free a man he knows to be guilty.

A Prime Minister has influence over peoples' lives and welfare like few others, so it's reasonable to assume that some virtues are required, and to examine which virtues these might be. Once we ascertain this, we can ask if professional virtues can conflict with personal virtues. Can we compare the criteria of a good Prime Minister to those of a good person^ix. Was the invasion of Iraq the act of a good Prime Minister or a good person? Before we do this though, it will be instructive to consider the purpose of government.

"One cannot begin discussing what it is to be a good politician ... without some prior consideration of what is involved in good politics." ^x So, what is good politics? What is the function of government? As with business, the government's purpose specifies government's values^xi. "It is by reference to its essential purpose that an activity is most sensibly evaluated"^xii If part of the government's purpose is to preserve freedom, this will impose certain obligations on it. If invading Iraq will preserve freedom, the government is obliged to order it. If its purpose is to preserve peace, then invading Iraq appears contrary to its obligations.

I assert however, that these purposes are value-judgements and extraneous. It is not the purpose of government to preserve peace, or freedom, any more than it is to determine what constitutes good taste or to enforce christian values. The government is neither church, nor charity, nor international police force. The British government has but one essential, defining purpose: to protect and to promote the interests of Britain and the British people.

Of course, this assertion raises its own questions. What are Britain's interests? Do they differ from the British peoples' interests? As the British people naturally change over time, becoming less accepting of authority and more willing to experiment with alternative lifestyles, there will be voices trying to 'protect' Britain from these changes. Similarly there will be actions on the world stage that will promote Britain, raising its status and increasing its influence, while all the time being of no interest or use to the British people, possibly even being detrimental to them.

While the interests of Britain and the British people are intimately linked, the difference between them will result in different responses to the same scenario. Invading Iraq may be in Britain's interest. It might bolster Britain's relationship with America, and remind the world that Britain still plays a role in world-shaping events. However, it may not be in the interests of the British people. It's certainly not in the interests of the soldiers who have to risk their lives, or their families who have to endure the worry.

We have a statement of the purpose of government, even if it itself raises questions. Let's now examine what it means to be a good Prime Minister.

Superficially, a British Prime Minister is elected by the popular vote, and thus must be popular. The populace must trust him, have confidence in his abilities, and believe that their interests can best be served by him rather than anyone else. Thus, while simply telling the people what they want to hear will work for a while, they will eventually realise he cannot back his words up and he will lose their trust and confidence.

Of course, just as a good plumber must actually be good at plumbing, so too must a good Prime Minister be good at running the country. "It is not so clear that ... a test of a good politician consists in the ability to get re-elected"^xiii. The interests of Britain and the British people must be protected and promoted. The economy must be kept stable, law and order must be maintained, threats must be guarded against. Being popular might keep you employed, but that does not mean you're good at your job.

So what are the virtues that a good Prime Minister must possess?

A good Prime Minister must be honest. After all, he has the trust of the people, and trust requires honesty. However, as we've seen, a Prime Minister will frequently find himself in a position where he is compelled to lie, or at the least to distort the truth. To lie would betray the trust the people have put in him, yet to tell the truth might jeopardise people's lives, people who are trusting him not to betray them. Phronesis, or practical wisdom becomes vital. While lying is always dishonest, it is possible to lie to someone for their own good. You might tell your notoriously volatile friend that his girlfriend had to leave because she felt sick, even though you saw her leave with another man. Your lie could prevent him starting a fight that would result in injuries to everyone. Similarly, a Prime Minister might lie to his country for its own sake. He might say a threat was minor, when in fact it was severe, in order to prevent a panic that would help no-one.

Alternatively, one might argue that a Prime Minister must have integrity rather than honesty. (One might also argue he needs both). This is the virtue of remaining true to yourself and your role, and not allowing yourself to become distracted by the possibilities of corrupt gain^xiv. "integrity demonstrates that virtue pitches the individual out ... toward the person, the ideal to which he is committed^xv"

Consider courage. A Prime Minister depends on popularity, so it is tempting to do only what is popular. Yet sometimes to do what is best for the country and its people, one must make unpopular choices such as raising taxes. To risk one's job for the sake of doing the right thing requires courage. The more unpopular it is, the more courage it requires and (assuming it really is the right thing to do) the more virtuous it is to stick with it^xvi. Again though, phronesis is vital. Why is it so unpopular? Is it simply that the population at large is adverse to change, or is unwilling to accept an unpleasant truth, or is it that your plan will adversely impact millions of lives and benefit only a very powerful few?

Similar considerations apply to the virtue of justice. A Prime Minister must be fair, being hard or lenient as required. If a man murders two schoolgirls, and the media whips the public up into a baying mob, a just and courageous Prime Minister would not be swayed by the furore.

A Prime Minister has been given a duty of care over his country and its people, so must possess compassion and the virtue of caring. The welfare of the people should matter to him as much as a doctor cares for those in her care. "Virtues are supposed to be ... conducive to human flourishing^xvii" and there is no particular reason why we can't extend this to cover the population at large. A good Prime Minister would wish to see his population flourish and have eudaimonia (being rationally happy and virtuously living well).

One last virtue worth considering is charity. For an individual, this is a virtue, but for a Prime Minister it serves no particular purpose. Being forgiving when one might reasonably be harsh is covered under the wise application of justice. Giving to those citizens in need is part of the virtue of caring. However, caring is not the same as charity. One can have a duty of care (as does a Prime Minister), but not a duty of charity^xviii. Charity is about giving to those in need, to whom you have no obligations, but every time a Prime Minister donates resources to those he has no obligation to, he is depriving those to whom he does have obligations. A person who bankrupts themselves to help others may be considered highly virtuous (although one might question the wisdom). A Prime Minister who bankrupts his country is certainly not^xix. One could argue that charity enhances the world's perceptions of Britain, and is thus in Britain's interests, but charity done for gain is not really charity.

Having examined the purpose of government and the virtues of a Prime Minister, let us turn to the nature of war.

War is a bad thing. It involves large scale violence, death and destruction. No-one is likely to dispute that these are things best avoided. So, if war is so bad, why would a virtuous person ever support it?

Virtue Ethics is unusual amongst ethical theories in that it accepts that scenarios exist where there can be no 'right' course of action. "there are situations such that whatever you do you necessarily emerge without clean hands"^xx. These are tragic dilemmas and they can happen to even a truly virtuous person. Not all tragic dilemmas are irresolvable though. There may be no right course of action, but there may be a least wrong^xxi.

Consider the virtuous mother who steals to feed her starving child. Stealing is dishonest and unjust, but allowing one's child to starve is callous and contrary to one's duty of care. If a third option cannot be found then whatever the mother does will be ethically wrong. So, she does what is least vicious, and steals the food. Provided she does so "after much hesitation and searching for possible alternatives, feeling deep regret^xxii" then she may still rightly be called a virtuous person.

So if we can formulate a scenario where a Prime Minister is forced to choose between war and an even less desirable alternative, then we can justify war.

I shall now look at some of the justifications that were put forward and examine whether they really are tragic dilemmas. While many arguments were suggested they were generally one of the following.

1. Threat Arguments: Saddam Hussein posed a threat to Britain or its interests.
2. Intervention Arguments: Saddam Hussein was doing bad things and had to be stopped.

Threat Arguments

This group of arguments were of the form "Britain or its interests are being threatened. The only way to prevent the threat is to invade Iraq". The nature of the threat varied from direct attack with weapons of mass destruction, through terrorist attack, to threats against Britain's allies (e.g. Israel) or its vital interests (e.g. oil).

The argument can be formally broken down into the following structure:

1. There is a threat.
2. This threat must be prevented.
3. The only way to prevent this threat is by invading Iraq.
4. The threat is less desirable than invading Iraq.
5. Therefore, Iraq must be invaded.

Following the policy of charity stated earlier, I will assume point 1, even though in most cases the perceived threat has since proven unfounded.

Point 2 is important, as there are threats that even a good Prime Minister need not necessarily prevent (recall our discussion on the purpose of government). Economic changes may threaten the British coal industry, but in a market economy such things happen. An influx of immigrants may threaten jobs, but may also beneficially increase competition.

Points 3 and 4 are key. Point 3 says this is a tragic dilemma, point 4 says its a resolvable dilemma. For a virtuous person to choose war, they must both be true.

First, lets look at a direct military threat against Britain from weapons of mass destruction. It is clearly not in the interests of Britain or the British people to have chemical weapons rain down on them, and the duty of care placed in the Prime Minister surely includes protecting against such unequivocal threats. Thus we're assuming point 1, and point 2 seems clear.

So, is invasion the only way to prevent this? To remove a threat, we should first ask why it is there. What were Saddam Hussein's reasons for threatening Britain. Remove those reasons and we remove the threat.

Here the principle of charity fails us. It was not in Saddam Hussein's interest to threaten Britain, precisely because such a threat would provoke an invasion. The only reason he would attack is in retaliation or self-defence. Phronesis suggests that an invasion would not prevent this threat, it would heighten it. The most effective way to prevent Iraq directly threatening Britain is for Britain to stop threatening Iraq.

The threat of terrorism is different. It is still a direct threat, and the Prime Minister still has a duty of care to protect against it, but the reasons for it differ. If Saddam Hussein hated Britain enough, or if he believed he could gain allies in the Arab world, a covert terrorist campaign may be in his interests where direct confrontation was not.

So, how can this threat be removed? Why would Islamic terrorists target Britain? Why would Iraq support them? These are complex questions, to which I cannot do justice, but superficially they are motivated by hatred of the west brought about by a perception of imperialist nations forcibly imposing their values on an Arab world that largely has no desire for them.

Would invasion avert this threat? Again phronesis would strongly suggest not. Western nations invading an Arab country will only reinforce perceptions of imperialism. Also, there is no reason to assume that western rule of Iraq would prevent terrorism there. The IRA operated quite effectively from within Northern Ireland despite British rule. At best, it would prevent Iraq-based terrorism, but there are plenty more countries that hate Britain. So if invasion will not work, will anything?

Western countries tend to make a big noise about refusing to negotiate with terrorists. The reasoning is sound. If you negotiate with terrorists, terrorism is seen to get results, and thus more people are inspired to take up terrorism as a means to achieve their ends. However, it is naïve to assume that by standing firm you can just hope they go away.

Would a good Prime Minister negotiate with terrorists to protect his country? Pride and stubbornness are not virtues, but justice is. Justice demands that terrorists are punished. If Iraq supports terrorists, perhaps invasion is just. However, a wise Prime Minister knows when justice is impossible. He also knows that the imposition of justice can be seen as an provocation. Hobbes said that justice should be applied with a view to the future good, not the past offence^xxiii. Hobbes was no virtue ethicist, but these are wise words.

Lets expand the discussion now from threats against Britain to threats against its allies and interests. The difference between these two kinds of threat is only one of closeness^xxiv, but this is an important difference as new considerations come into play. The arguments for defending your children may seem clear, but should you also defend your neighbour's children? What if your neighbour is also your friend, or your relative?

If an ally is threatened, a virtuous Prime Minister will defend them. To abandon an ally in their time of need after they trusted you is uncharitable and callous. This is in addition to the dishonesty of breaking a treaty. A virtuous agent does not pick and choose when to meet obligations, and would defend an ally against a trivial threat or insurmountable odds (although the nature of the defence may vary). Therefore a threat to an ally can be treated identically to a threat against Britain itself.

Of course this just means that on applying phronesis we'll come to the same conclusions. Saddam Hussein knew that he couldn't directly attack Kuwait or Israel for fear of retaliation, just as he couldn't attack Britain. Thus once again invasion is only likely to provoke an attack, whereas diplomacy and attempts to stop Israel threatening its neighbours are far more likely to succeed.

Similarly, he might well want to support terrorism against Israel, as in the Arab world Israel is hated as much as America. Again though, an invasion to protect Israel is only likely to cause more resentment.

None of the arguments so far can be reduced to a tragic dilemma, as they all have a more desirable third option. Neither a virtuous agent nor a good Prime Minister would find a compelling reason for invasion. We now come to the question of oil.

It cannot be doubted that Britain depends on oil, the majority of which comes from the middle east, and a large percentage of that from Iraq. Without oil, the country would rapidly fall to a standstill, as evidenced by the petrol strikes of September 2000. Even if Iraq never directly threatened Britain, it was certainly never a friend. An unfriendly power with significant control over a vital resource could well be considered a threat to Britain's interests. So what could be done? We could change supplier, make the unfriendly supplier friendly, or make the resource less vital.

In the case of oil, our choice of suppliers is limited so choosing another is not feasible. Making Iraq a friendly supplier is a far from trivial task. Saddam Hussein is almost universally hated by Britain's allies. To attempt to forge a friendship would anger them more than a good Prime Minister could accept. Justice suggests against a virtuous person forging a friendship with a man he knows to be engaged in acts of brutality and oppression. Charity might suggest that our friendship could persuade him to change, but practical wisdom suggests this is naïve.

So can we make our oil supply less vital? Certainly it is difficult to change the habits of a population, but not impossible. While Britain is not as oil-greedy as America, an enterprising Prime Minister could surely find alternative ways of powering the country. Global oil supplies will not last forever, so such measures will become essential at some point anyway.

So it would seem that a virtuous person would attempt to keep Iraq as friendly as possible until he'd reduced Britain's dependency on the resource. However, Britain is also an oil supplier, so it is not in Britain's interests to start decreasing peoples' dependence on oil. Not only would Iraq's power diminish, but so would Britain's. By invading Iraq and taking control of its oil, Britain's power increases.

In "Virtue ethics and satisficing rationality", Christine Swanton argues that "Even though an agent knows that A is the best action, she may have an undefeated reason for choosing another action^xxv". This suggests that a virtuous agent may choose to invade Iraq because it benefits Britain, even though reducing Britain's oil dependence is the better option. This will generally be for agent-centred reasons, such as the special closeness and identification that Britain represents. However, while we could reasonably conclude that a good Prime Minister would choose this course of action, to start a war for reasons of material gain cannot be considered virtuous. In VE, motives are important^xxvi, and the motivation here is little more than greed. It is mugging on a vast scale.

So far we've concluded that none of the threat arguments can be formulated as a tragic dilemma, and therefore a virtuous agent would not choose an invasion of Iraq. Let's move on to the other class of argument.

Intervention Arguments

Few doubted that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that the Iraqi population was being oppressed. There were therefore a number of arguments put forward of the form "Saddam Hussein is doing X, and he will keep doing it unless we invade". The argument can be formally broken down in a similar manner to that for threats. Again we'll assume point 1.

1. Saddam Hussein is doing something bad
2. We must intervene and stop it
3. The only way to stop it is for us to invade Iraq.
4. What we'll stop is less desirable than invading Iraq.
5. Therefore, Iraq must be invaded.

Whereas protecting Britain from threats was quite clearly something a Prime Minister should do, in the case of an intervention this point becomes less certain. Questions such as "Why must we intervene" and "Why must we intervene" become important. When does a virtuous agent intervene?

It is tempting to start talking about rights, and ask "what right does a virtuous agent have to interfere?" An examination of rights is complex and involved though and can often obscure the issue^xxvii. After all, exercising one's rights does not necessarily make you virtuous^xxviii. Instead the question we should be asking is "if I was a virtuous agent would I or should I intervene?".

Compassion demands that a virtuous agent, seeing suffering in another, would attempt to relieve the suffering. If a child was being bullied, would they not step in? But what if the child was being bullied by a sibling, or by its own parents? The issue becomes more complex. Scale the scenario up to a leader abusing his population, throw in international law, and you have a very involved situation.

If they knew that the Iraqi population was suffering, then a virtuous person would attempt to intervene. It would be counter to justice and charity to merely let it pass. This is the same as with any preventable suffering. Questions of closeness and size are relevant ("Though atrocities in war are much worse than the death of an aged parent, it would be perfectly appropriate for the virtuous person to react more strongly to the latter case than the first"^xxix) but the British people had no particularly pressing concerns that would have taken precedence.

Recall however what was said earlier about charity and the good Prime Minister. If it does not benefit Britain's interests, a good Prime Minister has no particular obligation to intervene, even when a good person would. However, if it is not contrary to Britain's interests, he could perhaps intervene as a good person without sacrificing his obligations as a good Prime Minister. In fact it could be argued that as a public relations exercise a humanitarian intervention could well benefit Britain's interests.

So, if a virtuous Prime Minister would intervene, then how? Is invasion the only way?

If someone is abusing someone else, the first course of intervention is to ask them to stop. When the abuser is a head of state and the abused is the population, this means diplomacy. However, if the abuser refuses to desist we need a method of persuasion, of which there are two. We can either say "stop, and you will be rewarded" or "stop, or else you will be punished".

To reward an abuser seems incongruous, and is not something a virtuous agent would do. If someone has done a bad thing, justice demands recompense to the victim, not rewards to the perpetrator. Rewarding the perpetrator is also uncharitable, as it compounds the suffering of the victim. Practical wisdom would suggest that rewarding the abuser would simply motivate him, or other potential abusers, to repeat the abuse in the hope of gaining further rewards once they desist. It could be that the virtuous agent may be in a dilemma, forced to choose between rewarding the abuser and allowing the abuse to continue, but this is more likely in cases of kidnapping or blackmail, and was not the case with Iraq. So, if a virtuous agent would not reward an abuser for stopping, would they punish him for continuing?

A proportionate punishment is in accordance with justice, and not counter to charity, so there's nothing preventing a virtuous agent from threatening it, especially if the only alternative is to allow the abuse to continue. However, if the abuser refuses to desist despite the threat and application of punishment we are back to square one. We again face the choice of reward or punishment, and we again opt for the threat of punishment, but if it didn't work last time it's unlikely to work this time unless we choose a different threat. This usually means threatening a stronger, more severe punishment.

When a state is being threatened with punishment, this involves such things as trade restrictions, sanctions and no-fly zones. If the state persistently refuses to co-operate, the punishments will become air strikes, and ultimately invasion. In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein had persistently failed to co-operate, despite a variety of punishments. It is not unreasonable to accept that threatening invasion was the only option remaining.

Importantly though, it is the threat of invasion that is necessary, not the invasion itself. If the aim is to get Saddam Hussein to stop abusing his population, then if he does stop we need not invade. We can't say "we must invade" unless we have first said "stop, or we will invade", and he has refused to stop. In the months before the invasion, when invasion was being threatened at every opportunity, there was a degree of co-operation from Saddam Hussein. Co-operation was slow and grudging, but it was better than it had been. However, the threat was effective because it was plausible. If I threaten you then I must be fully prepared to carry out my threat or any future threat is lessened in impact.

Now, I've looked at the question "must we invade", but not the question "must we invade". In the case of a child being abused by a parent, a virtuous agent might reasonably demand the parent desist, but they would not snatch the child away. There are authorities to do such things, and they have training and experience in the delicate art of taking a child from its family. The virtuous agent, being unskilled, might well harm the child further despite all the best intentions. Humility is a virtue^xxx, and this covers knowing your place in the wider context^xxxi, and knowing when there are more suitable agents than you to perform a given task.

The only equivalent to a kind of international Social Services is the United Nations, but the United Nations was not going to approve an invasion. If the appropriate authorities refuse to intervene is the virtuous agent then justified in intervening independently? If the law is inadequate, should the virtuous agent take the law into her own hands?

If intervention is justified and warranted, and the proper agency will not intervene, then yes, the virtuous agent would intervene independently if no other option is available. This is another example of a dilemma. Intervening independently is not ideal, and possibly even vicious, but abandoning the sufferer to their fate is worse.

So, in answer to the question "must we invade", we must conclude that we do. Intervention is necessary, and the only proper authority that exists has declined to intervene, therefore we must do so ourselves. We have established that invasion is the only method of intervention remaining to us, so it just remains for us to ask whether invasion is a lesser evil than the suffering we are trying to prevent.

Analogies can be drawn with the question of euthanasia^xxxii. On the surface, taking someone's life is an inarguably bad thing, just as war is an inarguably bad thing. However, if a person's life contains a heavy balance of evil over good, to such a degree that death would be a mercy, then taking their life may be a virtuous thing. So too could we examine the situations where a population's life was so weighted towards evil over good that the destruction brought by war may actually be a mercy.

We can imagine scenarios of such sustained suffering that the sweeping destruction of an invading army would seem like a release even if it brought devastation to everything you know and possibly your own death. It could perhaps be compared to the short agonising pain that must be endured to reset a dislocated joint. If a population is being slowly starved to death for example, as under Stalin's rule^xxxiii they might prefer war. If one lives in fear, day in and day out with no end in sight, one might welcome an invading army. War at least brings the possibility of change, and thus of hope. If a population is living without hope, then war could be preferable.

From the outside we can perhaps never be sure what the population is feeling, and whether or not it is truly without hope, but throughout this discussion I have tried to apply the principle of charity to all factual assertions. So, if the Prime Minister asserts the population was living without hope, then I shall assume this is true. Therefore invasion is the lesser evil.

Conclusion

We have arrived at a scenario where a virtuous person would choose to invade Iraq. If there is suffering, someone must intervene. If no-one else will, it must be us. A reward to stop the suffering is unacceptable, so we must threaten punishment. All lesser threats have failed so we must threaten invasion. Invasion is the lesser evil compared to living without hope. Therefore we must invade.

It is worth pointing out though that Iraq is not the only country in the world where the population is living without hope. Faced with multiple, unrelated instances of suffering a virtuous agent must choose who to help. This is another tragic dilemma, and may be irresolvable, meaning that two virtuous agents may quite validly come to two different decisions and both be right (or at least not wrong)^xxxiv. One person may choose to invade Iraq, another may choose to invade Sudan. Whichever is chosen though, either virtuous agent would, as soon as possible, intervene to stop the suffering they were forced to ignore. To avoid charges of inconsistency, Tony Blair must now intervene in all countries where the population lives without hope.

Bibliography

1. Or "an action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances". Rosalind Hursthouse Virtue Theory and Abortion p228 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
2. Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 p18; Edinburgh University Press
3. Rosalind Hursthouse Applying Virtue Ethics 2000 p95 ; Open University
4. Compare to Gilligan's conception of individual morality, as discussed in Lawrence A. Blum Gilligan and Kohlberg: implications for moral theory p126 ; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
5. Rosalind Hursthouse Applying Virtue Ethics (as above) pp76-78
6. Susan Wolf Ethics, legal ethics, and the ethics of law p199; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
7. Rosalind Hursthouse Applying Virtue Ethics (as above) p80
8. Susan Wolf Ethics, legal ethics, and the ethics of law (as above) p200
9. Rosalind Hursthouse Applying Virtue Ethics (as above) p77
10. Ibid. p80
11. Elaine Sternberg The business purpose specifies business values pp61-68; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
12. Ibid. p64
13. Susan Wolf Ethics, legal ethics, and the ethics of law (as above) p200
14. Robert C. Solomon Corporate roles, personal virtues p215 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
15. William F. May The virtues in a professional setting p157 ; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
16. Rosalind Hursthouse Virtue Ethics and the Emotions p101 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
17. James Bogen Suicide and virtue p19 ; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
18. A possible exception is the Islamic tradition. The Koran 1999ed N.J.Dawood (trans.) pp39-40 ; Penguin Classics
19. Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince 1999ed chXVI pp51-53 ; Penguin Classics.
20. Rosalind Hursthouse Applying Virtue Ethics (as above) p69
21. Ibid. p71
22. Rosalind Hursthouse Virtue Ethics and the Emotions (as above) p99
23. "In revenges ... men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow". Thomas Hobbes Leviathan 1994ed p96; Hackett
24. Michael Stocker Emotional Identification, Closeness and Size pp118-127 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
25. Christine Swanton Virtue ethics and satisficing rationality p85 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
26. Robert B. Louden Kant's virtue ethics p288 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
27. James Bogen Suicide and virtue (as above) p19
28. Ibid. p20
29. Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 p12; Edinburgh University Press
30. William F. May The virtues in a professional setting (as above) p158
31. Compare to ideas raised in: Thomas E. Hill Jr Ideals of human excellence and preserving natural environments pp94-95; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
32. Philippa Foot Euthanasia pp30-44; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
33. Ibid. p32
34. Rosalind Hursthouse Applying Virtue Ethics (as above) p67